The income distribution in the UK: a picture of advantage and disadvantage by Jenkins, Stephen P.
The income distribution in the UK: a picture of advantage and 
disadvantage
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103980/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Jenkins, Stephen P. (2015) The income distribution in the UK: a picture of 
advantage and disadvantage. CASEpapers (186). Centre for Analysis of Social 
Exclusion (CASE), London, UK. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
The income distribution in the UK: A picture of advantage 
and disadvantage 
 
 
Stephen P. Jenkins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
Definitions and sources .............................................................................................................. 1 
The UK income distribution, 2012–13 ...................................................................................... 4 
Trends in real income levels since 1961 .................................................................................... 8 
Inequality ................................................................................................................................. 10 
The prevalence of poverty ....................................................................................................... 14 
The prevalence of affluence ..................................................................................................... 16 
Income mobility and poverty dynamics ................................................................................... 19 
Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................. 21 
References ................................................................................................................................ 23 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE/186 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
February 2015 London School of Economics 
 Houghton Street 
 London WC2A 2AE 
 CASE enquiries – tel: 020 7955 6679 
i 
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
 
The Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) is a multi-disciplinary research 
centre based at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), within 
the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines 
(STICERD). Our focus is on exploration of different dimensions of social 
disadvantage, particularly from longitudinal and neighbourhood perspectives, and 
examination of the impact of public policy. 
 
In addition to our discussion paper series (CASEpapers), we produce occasional 
summaries of our research in CASEbriefs, and reports from various conferences and 
activities in CASEreports. All these publications are available to download free from 
our website. Limited printed copies are available on request.  
 
For further information on the work of the Centre, please contact the Centre Manager, 
Jane Dickson, on: 
 
Telephone:  UK+20 7955 6679 
Fax:  UK+20 7955 6951 
Email:  j.dickson@lse.ac.uk 
Web site: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case 
 
 
 
 
© Stephen P Jenkins 
 
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be 
quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including  notice, is 
given to the source. 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
Editorial note and acknowledgements 
Stephen Jenkins is a Professor of Economic and Social Policy in the Department of 
Social Policy at the London School of Economics and a CASE associate. He is also a 
Research Fellow at IZA (Bonn) and a Visiting Professor at the University of Essex. 
 
This paper is to appear as a chapter in Social Advantage and Disadvantage (H. Dean 
and L. Platt, eds.), OUP, 2015. I wish to thank Tony Atkinson, John Hills, Rob Joyce, 
Lucinda Platt, and other contributors to the volume for their comments and 
suggestions on a preliminary draft. For comments and advice on my use of HBAI and 
SPI data, I thank Nancy Singh and Peter Matejic (DWP) and Jeremy Reuben 
(HMRC). This research was partially supported by core funding of the Research 
Centre on Micro-Social Change at the Institute for Social and Economic Research by 
the University of Essex and the UK Economic and Social Research Council (award 
ES/L0009153). 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes the UK income distribution and how it has evolved over the last 
50 years. It also includes some comparisons with the income distributions of other rich 
countries. Multiple perspectives on the distribution are provided: there is evidence 
about real income levels and inequality, and the prevalence of affluence and of 
poverty. 
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This paper provides a picture of advantage and disadvantage in Britain using the lens 
provided by the most commonly-used measure of individuals’ material well-being, the 
income of the household to which they belong. Income is not the only indicator that 
may be used to characterise whether an individual is badly-off or well-off or to 
summarise the extent of poverty and affluence in a country overall. Complementary 
perspectives are provided by information about social inclusion and exclusion 
measured by a set of material deprivation indicators, individuals’ capabilities and 
functionings, whether their human rights are realised, or their social class. 
Nonetheless, income-based measures are particularly important. In a modern-day 
mixed economy such as the UK’s, individuals’ money income is the preeminent 
measure of their command over resources. For this reason, income is the principal 
focus of the statistics used to assess social progress in the UK and other rich countries. 
The strengths and weaknesses of using income to measure material living standards 
are not reviewed here. Instead, the aim of this paper is to describe the distribution of 
income in the UK today, documenting how it has changed over the last 50 years and 
how it compares with those of international comparators such as other European and 
OECD countries.  
 
The paper provides multiple perspectives on the income distribution. I discuss 
evidence about the real income levels and inequality, as well as the prevalence of 
poverty and of affluence. In the concluding section, I reflect on some of the issues 
raised by the evidence. First, however, I need to explain the definitions and sources 
used in the paper. 
 
Definitions and sources 
Throughout the paper (with an exception discussed below), an individual’s ‘income’ is 
the equivalised net income of the household to which he or she belongs. This is equal 
to the total money income received by all household members from all sources minus 
income taxes and national insurance contributions paid and some other deductions, 
deflated by an equivalence scale factor that adjusts for differences in household size 
and composition, and adjusted using a price index to take account of inflation.  
 
The specific money income sources included in the net income definition are those 
used by the Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP’s) Households Below Average 
Income (HBAI) statistics are shown in Table 1. (These statistics are the UK’s official 
statistics about the income distribution among persons.) Incomes are reported on a 
weekly basis. If someone reports earnings or other receipts over a longer period (e.g. 
an annual or monthly salary), the amount is converted to a weekly-equivalent amount 
pro rata.  
 
1 
Table 1: The definition and sources of net household income: receipts and 
deductions 
 Income sources: receipts and deductions: 
 (a) usual gross earnings from employment  
+ (b) earnings from subsidiary employment  
+ (c) profit or loss from self-employment 
+ (d) income from social security benefits and tax credits  
+ (e) private and occupational pensions 
+ (f) income from investments and saving 
+ (g) private transfers and other income 
– (h) income tax paid (employees and self-employed) 
– (i) local tax paid (Council tax) 
– (j) National Insurance contributions (employee and self-employed) 
– (k) contributions to occupational pension schemes 
= Net household income before the deduction of housing costs (‘BHC’) 
   
– (l) Housing costs: rent (gross of housing benefits), mortgage interest payments, water 
rates and other water charges, structural insurance payments (owner-occupiers), and 
ground rent and service charges 
= Net household income after the deduction of housing costs (‘AHC’) 
Notes: Equivalised net household income is equal to net household income divided by an equivalence 
scale (to adjust for differences in household size and composition). Incomes in different years are 
adjusted by a year-specific price index to express them in constant purchasing power terms. See main 
text for further details. 
 
Observe the distinction between net income before the deduction of housing costs (net 
income BHC) and net income after the deduction of housing costs (net income AHC). 
The HBAI statistics report income distribution estimates based on both definitions; the 
BHC definition is the one that is used by international organisations such as Eurostat 
and the OECD, and international data providers such as the Luxembourg Income 
Study, and is consistent with the recommendations of bodies such as the Expert Group 
on Household Income Statistics (2001). For this reason, my discussion focuses on 
distributions based on the net income BHC definition, but I also refer to AHC 
distributions measures where they lead to different conclusions about distributional 
trends. For further discussion of BHC and AHC measures, see Johnson and Webb 
(1992).  
 
In order to compare real living standards over time in constant purchasing power 
terms, taking account of the fact that £1 in 1990 is worth more than a £1 in 2000 
because of inflation, all incomes are adjusted using a price index and expressed in the 
prices of a particular year (financial year 2012–13 below). This assumes that all 
groups in society experience same rate of price inflation. Evidence about differences 
is provided by Flower and Wales (2014). 
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Equivalisation produces a measure of real living standards that is comparable across 
households in a given year. A money income of £500 per week (say) leads to higher 
living standards for a single householder than a childless married couple or a family of 
four. Looking at per capita income (total income divided by household size) would be 
one way of taking account of this issue, but this adjustment would not take account of 
potential economies of scale in the provision of household goods and services such as 
space, heat and light, food preparation and purchase, and so on. Two can live almost 
as cheaply as one. According to HBAI definitions, a net household income (BHC) of 
£500 per week for a married couple is equivalent in living standards terms to £750 
pounds per week for a single householder (£500 is two-thirds not one-half of £750). 
Children add to household needs, of course, but not as much as an additional adult. 
According to HBAI definitions, a net household income of £500 per week corresponds 
to £417 per week in living standards’ terms for a married couple with one child (aged 
less than 14 years), or £357 per week if there are two children. These adjustments are 
characterised by the so-called modified-OECD equivalence scale: see DWP (2014b) 
for further details and note the slightly different adjustment applied to AHC incomes. 
 
The final step in defining the income distribution is the assumption that the household 
income total is shared equally within each household, so that each individual is 
attributed with the equivalised income of the household to which he or she belongs. 
Individuals without income of their own, such as children, are assumed to benefit 
from income transfers by other individuals within the household. Supposing that 
complete income sharing is the universal rule is undoubtedly inaccurate, but it is also 
difficult to imagine what other assumptions would be more appropriate to implement. 
The equal-sharing assumption is widely adopted by analysts and statistical agencies 
around the world, not only in the UK. The assumption and alternatives are analysed by 
Jenkins (1991). There is also the issue of whether the aggregate ‘income unit’ should 
be taken to be the household, or the more narrowly defined nuclear family (or ‘benefit 
unit’) as in the UK’s pre-HBAI low income statistics. See also National Equality 
Panel (2010), which provides information about the distribution of ‘individual 
incomes’ – the distribution arising were each adult to benefit only from the income 
that he or she received. 
 
Estimates of income distributions characterised using the definitions outlined are 
derived in the UK using data from the Family Resources Survey, a large household 
survey that has been running since the early 1990s, with data for earlier years (back to 
1961) coming from the Family Expenditure Survey. At several points below, I 
supplement the survey-based estimates with information derived from income tax data 
from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). For assessing advantage, tax 
data have benefits compared with household surveys because there is better coverage 
of the top of the income distribution and arguably measurement error may be less. In 
addition, sample sizes are much larger and some data series go back to the beginning 
of last century. On the other hand, the distributional definitions are less satisfactory 
because they are constrained by what is relevant to administer the income tax system: 
they refer to gross taxable (or after-tax) income of tax units (which in the UK refer to 
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individuals since 1990). And the most detailed data (from the Survey of Personal 
Incomes) refer to taxpayers rather than to the full population. 
 
The final point to note about definitions is that this paper is about income. Income is 
not the same as ‘consumption’, which refers to the resources actually enjoyed by 
households (measured in terms of their spending) rather than their potential command 
over resources. Income is arguably a better indicator of someone’s economic power. 
(For comparisons of distributions of consumption expenditure and income in the UK, 
see Brewer and O’Dea (2012).) Also, income and consumption each refer to flows per 
period, and should be distinguished from the stock of financial assets at a particular 
point in time, i.e. wealth.  
 
The UK income distribution, 2012–13 
The UK’s income distribution in 2012–13 (BHC definition) is pictured in Figure 1. 
(See DWP 2014a for the corresponding AHC picture.) The chart shows the numbers 
of individuals with (equivalised) incomes in each £10 band between zero and £1000 
per week. The stripes classify individuals according to where they stand in the income 
parade that orders them from poorest to richest. The poorest tenth (decile group 1) are 
on the left and the richest tenth (decile group 10) on the right, with the other eight 
decile groups in between. The frequency distribution is not bell-shaped as with a 
Normal distribution; rather, it is skewed with a long right-hand tail. Not all of the very 
richest individuals can be shown on the chart: the income of the person in the middle 
of richest tenth (the 95th percentile) is £1,117 per week, and there are around 2.93 
million people with incomes above this amount. 
 
The greatest concentration of individuals along the income range is between about 
£250 and £400 per week (the frequencies are greatest, and the stripes narrowest). The 
middle income (the median or 50th percentile) is £440 per week, which is only 82% of 
the average (mean) income of £535 per week. The person with average income is 
found some two-thirds of the way along the income parade and hence not particularly 
representative of ‘middle incomes’. Also shown in Figure 1 is the value of the most-
commonly used poverty line in the UK and Europe (60 per cent of median income). 
The threshold was £264 per week in 2012–13, and it can be seen that between 15 per 
cent and 20 per cent of individuals were income-poor in 2012–13. (More detail about 
the prevalence of disadvantage is provided later.) Finally, observe the perhaps 
surprisingly large number of individuals with an income between £0 and £10 per 
week. Although this refers to fewer than 1 per cent of the UK population, the number 
raises questions about the accuracy of measurement of very low incomes. On this, see 
Brewer et al. (2009). 
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Figure 1: The UK income distribution, 2012–13 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data from the spreadsheet accompanying Chart 2.4 (BHC) in 
DWP (2014a). 
 
The HBAI data also tell us who the poorest and richest individuals were in 2012–13. 
Table 2 shows the composition of the poorest tenth and the richest tenth, using a range 
of subgroup definitions that classify individuals according to their or their family’s 
characteristics. 
 
Table 2 shows, for example, that adult men and women and children are represented 
in the poorest tenth in proportion to their numbers in the population as a whole, but 
men are over-represented in the richest tenth (45 per cent compared to 38 per cent) 
and children are under-represented (16 per cent compared with 21 per cent). 
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Table 2: Composition of the poorest and richest tenths of the 2012–13 income 
distribution, by subgroup 
 Subgroup share (%) of: 
Subgroup Poorest tenth Richest tenth Population 
Sex and adulthood    
Adult man 38.6 45.0 38.3 
Adult woman 39.5 39.6 40.5 
Child 21.9 15.5 21.2 
Family type    
Pensioner couple 10.3 12.3 13.6 
Single male pensioner 1.9 1.3 1.9 
Single female pensioner 7.5 1.7 5.2 
Couple with children 32.4 32.6 34.9 
Single with children 10.1 1.0 8.0 
Couple without children 13.1 35.3 18.4 
Single male without children 16.0 10.9 10.8 
Single female without children 8.6 5.1 7.2 
Economic status     
One or more self employed 14.8 18.1 9.8 
Single/couple all in full time work 4.9 45.7 26.2 
Couple/one in full time, one part time 2.6 13.2 13.1 
Couple, one full time one not working 8.3 8.2 10.5 
No full time, one or more part time worker 15.0 5.2 10.1 
Workless, head or spouse aged 60 or over 20.7 6.7 17.3 
Workless head or spouse unemployed 14.6 0.7 3.8 
Workless, other inactive 19.2 2.3 9.3 
Region    
Rest of the UK 75.3 55.4 73.2 
London and South East 24.7 44.6 26.8 
Notes: Author’s estimates using data from the public-use file of unit-record HBAI data 
(accompanying DWP 2014a). Reading note: 38.6% of the poorest tenth and 45.0% of the richest tenth 
in 2012–13 were adult men; 38.3% of the total population were adult men. 
 
Individuals from pensioner couples, and couples with and without children families, 
are under-represented in the poorest tenth relative to their numbers in the population 
as a whole (see the second panel). Over-represented are single female pensioners, 
individuals in lone parent families, and childless singles. In the richest tenth, almost 
all groups are under-represented, with one striking exception. Childless couples are 
substantially over-represented, and account for more than one-third of the richest tenth 
though they comprise only 18 per cent of the population. 
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The third panel of Table 2 shows that over- and under-representation at the top and 
bottom is closely associated with participation in paid employment. For example, 
individuals in benefit units in which all adults are in full-time work are substantially 
under-represented in the poorest tenth (5 per cent compared with their population 
proportion of 26 per cent) and substantially over-represented in the richest tenth (46 
per cent compared to 26 per cent). The situation is reversed for non-pensioner families 
in which the head or spouse is unemployed: individuals in this group comprise almost 
4 per cent of the population, but nearly 15 per cent of the poorest tenth and less than 1 
per cent of the richest tenth. By contrast, individuals belonging to a family with self-
employment income are over-represented in both the poorest and the richest tenths. 
The final panel shows that, although there is no southern tilt to the composition of the 
poorest tenth, people living in London and the South East form a substantially greater 
fraction of the richest tenth than would be expected from their relative numbers in the 
country as a whole (45 per cent compared to 27 per cent). 
 
These patterns of subgroup over- and under-representation at the bottom and the top 
reflect the distribution of income within each of the various subgroups. These 
subgroup distributions are summarised in Figure 2 using boxplots. The left and right 
hand ends of the box for each group show the 25th and 75th percentiles for that group 
(half the group have incomes within this range). The end of the ‘whisker’ extending 
left from the box shows the 10th percentile for the subgroup, whereas the end of the 
right whisker shows the 90th percentile (80 per cent of the subgroup have incomes 
within the range spanned by the box and whiskers). Subgroup median income (50th 
percentile) is shown by the black bar within the box. The vertical dashed lines show 
the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for the population as a whole (‘all individuals’; as 
also shown in Figure 1), and hence demarcate the thresholds used to define income 
groups in Table 2.  
 
The boxplots illustrate both subgroup income levels and the range of subgroup 
incomes. Individuals in families with children, and dependent children in particular, 
tend to have lower incomes than other groups. Although the distribution among all 
women closely mimics that of the population as a whole, there are groups of woman 
who are clearly worse off: look at the plots for single female pensioners and the 
‘single with children’ group (most of whom are in families headed by lone mothers). 
In contrast, childless couples have relatively high incomes: almost three-quarters of 
this group have an income above the population median.  
 
The third panel highlights the importance of paid employment for income, with 
distributions further to the left (lower) as the degree of participation falls. For 
example, contrast individuals in benefit units in which all individuals are in full-time 
work (more than 75 per cent have an income above the population median) with 
individuals in a family with an unemployed head or spouse (almost 90 per cent have 
an income below the population median). Families with self-employed members are a 
distinctive case because of the relatively high prevalence of both low incomes and 
(especially) very high incomes. Substantially more than one-tenth of this group have 
an income placing them in the richest 5 per cent of the population as a whole.  
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Figure 2: Income distributions for population subgroups, UK, 2012–13  
 
Notes: Each subgroup’s boxplot shows the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles for the relevant 
subgroup: see the main text. The vertical dashed lines show the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for 
the population as a whole (‘all individuals’). Graph drawn by the author using data from the 
spreadsheet accompanying Belfield et al. (2014) – see IFS (2014) – for ‘all individuals’ and his 
calculations using data from the public-use file of unit-record HBAI data (accompanying DWP 
2014a) for all other groups. Incomes in the public-use HBAI file are rounded to the nearest pound. 
 
The fourth panel of Figure 2 highlights the relative affluence of most individuals 
living in London and the South East. The person at the 75th percentile for this region’s 
distribution is clearly within the richest twentieth of the population ranked by income 
(see Figure 1), whereas the corresponding person in the distribution for the rest of the 
UK is on the borders of the richest seventh and eighth tenths nationally. More than 10 
per cent of individuals living in London and the South East are in the richest 5 per 
cent of the population. 
 
Trends in real income levels since 1961 
Conclusions about the extent to which real incomes have been rising depend a lot on 
how long one looks back and which part of the income distribution one considers. See 
Figure 3, which shows income levels at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles, as well as 
the mean. Grey stripes demarcate recessions. (Appendix Table A1 summarises the 
trends shown in the graph, providing income growth rates for the period as a whole 
and subperiods within it.) 
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Looking at the fifty-year period since 1961, the general picture is of rising incomes for 
all, punctuated by short periods of slow or negative growth accompanying recessions. 
The sharpest deviation from trend is the period after 2007, i.e. following the most 
recent recession, though it should be noted that a slowing in income growth is also 
apparent earlier – from the beginning of the 2000s – and there was also a period of 
little growth in the early-1990s. 
 
Figure 3: Trends in real income levels since 1961 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data from the spreadsheet accompanying Belfield et al. 
(2014) – see IFS (2014). The grey strips identify periods with at least two consecutive quarters of 
negative real GDP growth. p10, p50, and p90 are the 10th percentile, 50th percentile (median), and 
90th percentile, respectively. The data refer to financial years from 1994 onwards, and the estimates 
to the UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. See Appendix Table A1 for numerical 
estimates of growth rates for the period as a whole as well as subperiods. 
 
Also striking is the differential income growth across the income range: growth has 
been greatest at the top and small at the bottom. Over the five decades between 1961–
2012, the 90th percentile grew by 130 per cent (equivalent to a rate of around 1.6% per 
year), the median grew by 97 per cent and the 10th percentile by 89 per cent 
(equivalent to 1.3% per year in both cases). Although income falls were greatest for 
the richest groups between 2007 and 2012 (the 90th percentile fell by 6.2% per year; 
the 10th percentile by 0.2% per year), this reversal of fortunes is small if compared 
with the longer-term trend of growing real incomes at the top.  
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The fall in real incomes across the income distribution after the most recent recession 
is not as dramatic as the squeeze on real wages reported by Gregg, Machin, and 
Fernández-Salgado (2014), particularly at the bottom of the distribution. Several 
factors are likely to explain this. For example, a fall in real wages of one household 
member might be offset by more work hours by another household member. 
Household composition may itself change: e.g. young people may be more likely to 
live with their parents or share with others. And the safety net income provided by 
benefits and tax credits has continued to provide a real income floor.  
 
Inequality  
The growing gap between top and bottom incomes shown in Figure 3 implies growth 
in income inequality. Inequality is summarised directly in Figure 4, in terms of the 
ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile (p90/p10) and the Gini coefficient. Regardless of 
which index is used, the rise in inequality over the last fifty years has been substantial: 
between 1961 and 2011, the Gini rose by almost one-third and p90/p10 by around one 
half. Most of that inequality growth occurred in the 1980s. Clearly this is an 
exceptional period: within both the preceding two decades and the subsequent two, the 
two inequality series are relatively flat, with relatively small year-on-year changes. 
Nonetheless, there is a small but distinct decline in p90/p10 after 1991 that is not 
apparent in the Gini coefficient. This reflects changes in the distribution of incomes 
below the median to which the Gini is not as sensitive (graphs not shown).  
 
Inequality declined during the most recent recession, reflecting the larger income falls 
for those at the top compared to those at the bottom, but even this inequality decline is 
relatively small and a bit smaller than the decline in the early- to mid-1970s (when 
inequality was much lower).  
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Figure 4: Income inequality since 1961 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data from the spreadsheet accompanying Belfield et al. 
(2014) – see IFS (2014). The data refer to financial years from 1994 onwards, and the estimates to the 
UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. 
 
The level and trend in inequality in the UK is compared with those of 20 other OECD 
countries in Figure 5 (the distributional definitions are similar to those employed in 
previous charts). Countries are grouped according to whether inequality fell, 
increased, or remained much the same, between the mid-1980s and 2011–12, with 
inequality measured using the Gini coefficient. The UK’s estimate for 2011–12, 
around 0.34, places it just above the average in the 21-country ranking (the OECD 
Gini was around 0.32) but, if middle-income countries such as Mexico and Turkey are 
excluded, the UK shows up more clearly as a high-inequality country relative to other 
rich countries. Inequality in the UK is not as great as in the USA, however. 
 
Figure 5 also shows that the majority of OECD countries experienced inequality 
growth over the last quarter century; it was not only the UK. Moreover, the magnitude 
of the increase was greater in a number of other countries besides the UK, several of 
which were relatively low-inequality countries in the mid-1980s (Finland, Sweden, 
and Germany). (Be aware that the inequality-increase rankings are contingent on the 
period considered: the increase in the UK during the 1980s, shown earlier, was 
substantial by cross-national standards.) Nonetheless, the chart also demonstrates that 
an increase in inequality is not inevitable: inequality changed hardly at all in three EU-
15 nations (France, the Netherlands, and Belgium).  
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Figure 5: Income inequality in 21 OECD countries: mid-1980s and 2011/12 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data in the spreadsheet accompanying OECD (2014, Figure 
1). This source provides details of the actual years compared for each country. ‘Little change’ in 
inequality refers to changes of less than 1.5 percentage points. Countries are ordered within each 
panel by their Gini coefficient for 2011/12. Income is household disposable income adjusted for 
household size. 
 
If the comparison is with the EU-15 as a whole, income inequality in the UK has been 
greater for most of the last decade but in 2013 was about the same. At the beginning 
of the 2000s, the UK Gini was around four percentage points greater than the EU-15 
Gini, but the former subsequently declined and the latter increased. In 2013, both 
Ginis were around 0.30: see Appendix Figure A2. (The UK estimates differ slightly 
from those shown in Figure 4 because they are derived from different data sources.)  
 
Much of the trend in UK inequality has been driven by what happens to top incomes 
and yet estimates derived from household surveys (such as shown in Figure 3) may 
miss what is going on at the very top of the income distribution. In contrast, income 
tax data have better coverage of the richest incomes and provide estimates for a much 
longer period. 
 
Estimates of top income shares derived from tax data are shown in Figure 6 and go 
back almost a century. The series shown in black shows trends in the share of total 
income held by the richest 10%, 1%, and 0.1%. The share of the top 10% in 2011, 
around 40%, is much the same as it was just after World War I. Over the subsequent 
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six decades, the share declined by around 10 percentage points, but increased steadily 
thereafter albeit with a pause associated with the most recent recession. A U-shaped 
trend is also apparent for the shares of the top 1% and top 0.1%, though the inequality 
increases since the late 1970s have not taken the shares back to WWI levels. Also 
shown are trends in the shares of nearly-top groups variously defined (the series in 
grey) and, intriguingly, there is no distinct U-shape to these series as there is for the 
others. This implies that the U-shape trends for top income shares are being driven by 
what is happening to the very richest group (the richest 0.1% in this case).  
 
Figure 6: Top income shares (%) in the UK over the last 100 years 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data from the World Top Incomes Database (Alvaredo et al. 
2014). The vertical dashed line marks the change in the definition of the tax unit from the family to 
the individual in 1990.  
 
Thus, even though inequality in the UK has not grown much over the last two decades 
according to HBAI-based measures (Figure 4), the evidence from tax data about top 
income shares suggests a continuing and substantial rise in inequality over this period. 
Put differently, recent inequality trends are a story of greater differentials that are 
driven by increasing advantage. The UK experience is similar to that of other ‘Anglo’ 
countries such as the USA, but is less apparent in other countries such as Germany, 
and especially France where the long inequality decline has not been followed by a 
large inequality rise. See Appendix Figure A3 and, for more extensive cross-national 
comparisons, Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011). 
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The prevalence of poverty 
Historically, social policy has been particularly concerned with the prevalence of 
poverty rather than other aspects of income distribution. Trends in income poverty are 
the subject of this section. 
 
A fundamental issue is how the income cut-off that differentiates poor people from 
non-poor people should be defined. The threshold most commonly employed by the 
European Union, and the UK as well, is 60% of contemporary national median 
income. The ‘contemporary national’ tags mean that the poverty line varies from one 
year to the next (as median income changes), and differs in real terms across countries 
(UK median income is substantially greater than Romanian median income, for 
instance).  
 
This ‘relative poverty’ definition implements – in a particular way – the idea that 
‘[p]eople are said to be living in poverty if their income and resources are so 
inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of living considered acceptable 
in the society in which they live’ (Council of the European Union, 2004: 8). Although 
a relative poverty definition has many conceptual attractions, it can lead to 
implausible estimates in times of economic boom or sharp recession when the median 
income itself can change substantially (Jenkins et al., 2013: chapter 1).  
 
This suggests that more ‘absolute’ poverty threshold definitions be employed in 
tandem with relative ones. However, few would seriously argue that a fully absolute 
definition – a real income cut-off that is fixed over time and the same for all countries 
– is appropriate for rich countries such as the UK. More commonly used for assessing 
trends are ‘anchored’ poverty lines. The idea is that poverty in the current year and 
previous years be assessed using a threshold that is fixed at the value of the relative 
poverty line for an earlier (but relatively recent) year. Thus, DWP HBAI publications 
supplement estimates based on a cut-off of 60% of contemporary national median 
income with estimates based on a threshold equal to 60% of 2010–11 median income 
or (previously) the 1998–99 median. The Institute for Fiscal Studies has provided data 
on anchored poverty rates using the 1996–97 median, which I use. Estimates of 
poverty rates for the last fifty years based on the relative and two anchored thresholds 
are shown in Figure 7. 
 
Clearly, the choice of low-income cut-off makes a substantial difference to estimates 
of both the prevalence of poverty in recent years, and its trend over time. Using the 
relative poverty line based on contemporary medians, the poverty rate fluctuated 
between around 12 per cent and 15 per cent in the twenty years after 1961, then 
increased sharply to reach more than 20 per cent in the late-1980s, and has been 
gradually declining since the early 1990s. In particular, the poverty rate continued to 
decline during the recent recession – because the median also fell (Figure 3). 
According to the relative poverty line definition, the UK poverty rate in 2012–13 was 
15.4 per cent, corresponding to around 9.7 million poor people.  
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Figure 7: Poverty rates (%) since 1961: relative and anchored poverty lines  
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data from the spreadsheet accompanying Belfield et al. 
(2014) – see IFS (2014). The data refer to financial years from 1994 onwards, and the estimates to the 
UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. The BHC income definition is used (see text). 
 
The poverty experience differs for particular subgroups. Of particular relevance for 
policy in recent years is child poverty and pensioner poverty. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the child poverty rate was nearly 10 percentage points higher than the all-
persons rate, but it has declined at a faster pace and was only two percentage points 
larger in 2012–13. The decline in pensioner poverty rates has been substantial, from 
around 40 per cent in the 1960s to the same as the all-persons rate in 2012–13, albeit 
with large increases and declines in between. See Appendix Figure A4 for details. For 
more extended discussion of long-run trends, see Cribb et al. (2013: chapter 5). 
 
These estimates are based on a BHC income definition. If, instead, an AHC income 
definition is used, the picture of poverty levels and trends is different, especially since 
the 1990s. In 1990, the AHC relative poverty rate was 24 per cent (compared to a 
BHC rate of 21 per cent) but did not decline at the same rate thereafter. In 2012–13, 
the AHC relative poverty rate was 21 per cent (13.2 million people), i.e. around six 
percentage points greater than the BHC rate for that year. See Appendix Figure A5 for 
details. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
w
ith
 in
co
m
e
 
be
lo
w
 
th
re
sh
ol
d
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
 
60% of 1996-97 median
60% of 2010-11 median
60% of contemporary median
Low-income threshold
15 
The BHC series based on anchored poverty lines show a substantial decline in poverty 
rates over the last five decades. For example, according to the relative poverty 
standards of the mid-1990s, more than half of the UK population was poor in the early 
1960s, but only one-tenth five decades later. The rate of decline in both anchored 
series slows noticeably from around 2000 onwards – which is unsurprising given the 
slowing of income growth rates at the bottom of the distribution around that time 
(Figure 3). Observe as well and by contrast with the relative poverty series, that both 
anchored poverty series show a rise in the poverty rate with the recent recession 
(albeit a relatively small one).  
 
The UK has a relative poverty rate two or three percentage points higher than the EU-
15 average from 1995 until around 2009 after which the rates converged: the UK rate 
declined (reflecting the falling UK median) and the EU-15 rate increased slightly. 
Again, using anchored poverty lines for each country (60 per cent of national medians 
in 2008) reveals a different picture for the post-recession period. In particular, both the 
UK and EU-15 poverty rates are estimated to increase by around two percentage 
points in the following four years, and so the differential is maintained. See Figure 
A6.  
 
The prevalence of affluence 
The prevalence of affluence can also be assessed in terms of relative and anchored 
thresholds and, again, the specific choice is somewhat arbitrary. I use twice the 
contemporary median, and a fixed real income threshold equal to £1,000 per week in 
2012–13 prices. 
 
Estimates using these two thresholds are shown in Figure 8, and derived from the 
same data that are used to compile the DWP’s HBAI statistics. The proportion of 
persons with an income greater than twice the contemporary median has remained 
remarkably stable since the mid-1990s, at around 11 per cent. The figure also 
highlights substantial differences in the prevalence of affluence in London and the 
South East (a rate of around 17 per cent over the last two decades) with the its 
prevalence in the rest of the UK (a rate of around 8 per cent).  
 
With the fixed £1,000-per-week threshold, the prevalence of affluence steadily 
increased, more than doubling from around 4 per cent in the mid-1990s to around 9 
per cent in 2009, after which the rate fell by several percentage points. Again, 
individuals living in London and the South East had higher rates than those in the rest 
of the UK throughout the period, but the trends for each group mimicked the national 
picture. 
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Figure 8: Percentages of individuals with an equivalised income greater than 
twice the contemporary median (dotted lines) or greater than £1000 per week 
(2012–13 prices) (solid lines) 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using public-use files of HBAI unit record data accompanying 
DWP (2014a). The income definition is the same as the BHC definition used in Figures 1–4. The data 
refer to financial years from 1994 onwards, and the estimates to the UK from 2002–03 and Great 
Britain in earlier years. 
 
The advantage of summaries such as Figure 8 is that they use the definitions routinely 
used to assess the income distribution in the UK. However, as discussed earlier, the 
coverage of top incomes in the underlying household survey data is not as good as 
income tax data on incomes. 
  
Changes in the prevalence of affluence in the UK between 1995–96 and 2010–11 
estimated from income tax data are summarised in Figure 9 using two absolute 
thresholds: £500,000 per year and £1,000,000 per year of after-tax income (in 2012–
13 prices). By HBAI standards, an income above these cut-offs would place a person 
well into the top 1% of the income distribution. It is important to note, however, that 
these estimates refer to proportions of all taxpayers, not the population as a whole as 
in previous analysis, with most non-taxpayers having little or no income. (In 2010–11, 
there were around 31.3 million taxpayers, but the UK population was around 60 
million.) 
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Figure 9: Percentages of taxpayers with an after-tax income greater than 
£500,000 and greater than £1 million pounds per year (2012–13 prices)  
 
Notes: Years shown are financial years, e.g. 2010 refers to 2010–11. The data refer to taxpayers only, 
and are not available for 2008–09. Data for 1995–96 are not used because of a series discontinuity 
(introduction of self-assessment and changes to the SPI methodology). Graph drawn by the author 
using data from the public-use files of the Survey of Personal Incomes (various years). Incomes 
converted to 2012–13 prices using within-year averages of the monthly Consumer Price Index for 
each financial year. 
 
Figure 9 shows that the proportion of taxpayers with an after-tax income of more than 
£500 million per year rose fivefold between the mid-1990s and the late-2000s, from 
around 0.02 per cent to nearly 0.10 per cent. The growth in the prevalence of 
taxpayers with an after-tax income of more than £1 million per year is more muted. 
The proportion remained at around 0.01 per cent from the mid-1990s until the early 
2000s, but increased thereafter and by 2009–10 it was some three times higher. (The 
numbers of taxpayers involved is still only a few thousand.) 
 
The marked rise in the prevalence of affluence appears to go into reverse after 2009–
10, with both series showing much lower rates for 2010–11, with the fraction of 
millionaire taxpayers roughly halving for example. One obvious explanation for this 
reversal of fortunes is the recent recession. However, other more subtle changes mean 
that one has to be cautious about interpreting the 2010–11 estimates. In particular, a 
50 per cent marginal rate of income tax was introduced in April 2010, and the 
announcement and introduction of this tax rate provided incentives for high income 
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tax payers to bring forward income to 2009–10 that would otherwise have been 
reported in 2010–11 income tax returns or possibly later years.  
 
This is the process of ‘forestalling’, discussed in more detail by HM Revenue and 
Customs (2012) and Cribb et al. (2012, 2013). Reverse forestalling in reaction to the 
reduction of the top marginal tax rate to 45 per cent (from April 2013) is also likely to 
affect reporting for later years. These issues make assessment of recent trends in the 
income distribution problematic for any summary measure that is calculated using top 
incomes, including the Gini inequality index (Cribb et al., 2013). However, the effects 
on the Gini (cf. Figure 4) are likely to be minor compared to their effects on estimates 
of the prevalence of affluence based on fixed real income thresholds as in Figure 7 
and especially Figure 8.  
 
The growth in affluence is shown for selected subgroups in Appendix Figure A7 using 
a threshold of £100,000 per year (2012–13 prices). The chart shows that such high 
after-tax incomes are much more prevalent among male taxpayers than female 
taxpayers, and among taxpayers in London and the South East than among all 
taxpayers. Prevalence rates rose for all groups between the mid-1990s and the onset of 
the late-2000s recession. Figure A7 also highlights the relatively large prevalence of 
high incomes among taxpayers working in the financial industry: in 1997–98 about 
2½ per cent of this group had after-tax incomes over the £100,000 threshold; in 2009–
10, the proportion was 7 per cent. 
 
For further discussion of top incomes through to the mid-2000s, the income tax data, 
and comparisons with HBAI series, see Brewer, Sibieta, and Wren-Lewis (2008). On 
recent trends in top wage income, see Bell and Van Reenen (2013). 
 
Income mobility and poverty dynamics 
The perspectives on distributional trends employed so far do not take account of the 
fact that someone who is poor in one year may be non-poor in the following year (or 
vice versa). Similarly, there is mobility into and out of middle- and top-income 
groups. The group of people that is poor – or rich – is not fixed over time.  
 
Evidence about income mobility throughout the income range is displayed in Table 3. 
Individuals are classified by their quintile group origins in 2000 and their income 
group membership is tracked over the following eight years. The table shows that 
mobility is common but most of it is relatively short-distance. Only around one-
seventh of individuals in the poorest fifth in 2000 remained in the poorest fifth in all 
nine years, though nearly one half spent all or the majority of years in that group. But 
this also means that 45 per cent spent the majority of years in the period in a higher 
income group. At first glance, downward mobility from the richest fifth in 2000 is less 
common than upward mobility from the poorest fifth, since just over a quarter of 
individuals with richest-fifth origins remained there all years, but around 40 per cent 
spent the majority of years in a lower income group. There is more scope for both 
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upward and downward mobility for those starting in the middle: around two-thirds of 
those in the middle fifth in 2000 spent significant periods in a different income group. 
 
Table 3: Where in the income distribution individuals spent the majority of their 
time over the nine-year period, 2000–2008 
 Quintile group in 2000 
 Bottom 
(poorest) 
Second Third Fourth Top 
(richest) 
All 
individuals 
All years in the same quintile 
group as 2000   14     3     2     4   26   10 
Majority of years in same 
quintile group as 2000   41   36   32   36   34   36 
Majority of years above 2000 
quintile group   45   31   25   16 …   23 
Majority of years below 2000 
quintile group …   14   25   29   40   22 
None of the above …   17   15   16 …     9 
All individuals 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: ‘Majority of years in same quintile group’ row: five or more years out of nine in the same 
quintile group as in base-year but does not include the individuals in the ‘All years in same quintile’ 
row. ‘None of the above’ implies that the individual has neither remained in the same quintile group 
as the base-year, nor been in a higher or lower quintile group for five of the nine years. ‘…’: no 
estimate (not logically possible given definitions of groups). Source: Department for Work and 
Pensions (2010, Tables 3.2 (BHC) and 3.3 (BHC)), derived from British Household Panel Survey 
data. See Appendix Table A2 for corresponding estimates for the 1990s. 
 
Despite the changes in the income distribution during the 1990s and 2000s shown 
earlier, the patterns of mobility were very similar in the two decades. See Appendix 
Table A3 which provides estimates for the two periods in the same format as Table 3. 
The no-change conclusion is also reported by Jenkins (2011) using an extensive 
portfolio of mobility measures. 
 
The experience of poverty is likely to be more unpleasant the longer that it is 
experienced; thus, there is particular interest in the extent of poverty persistence. 
Information about its trends is provided by Figure 10. This shows the distribution of 
the number of times that individuals are poor within successive four-year periods. 
(The first calculation is for 1991–1994 and then the observation window is moved 
along a year at a time; the latest period is 2005–2008. The BHPS ended in 2008.) 
Using DWP (2010) definitions, an individual is persistently poor if he or she is poor 
three or four times in the four-year period. Figure 10 shows that since the mid-1990s, 
the persistent poverty rate has declined substantially, by around one-third from 15 per 
cent to nearly 10 per cent between the first four-year period and the one beginning in 
2004. Over the same period, the number of people experiencing occasional poverty 
(one or two years poor in a four-year period) increased slightly over the same, and the 
proportion never poor increased from 65 per cent to 70 per cent. As the recession hit, 
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however, the earlier trends reversed somewhat. For example, for the 2005–2008 
period, the proportion persistently poor was around two percentage points larger than 
for the previous four-year period, and the proportion never poor fell by roughly the 
same amount. 
 
The downward trend in persistent poverty prior to the late-2000s recession reflects 
improvements that are greatest for groups such as families with children, especially 
lone parent families, and also single pensioners. See Jenkins (2011: chapter 8) for 
details. 
 
Figure 10: Percentages of individuals poor once, twice, or three or more times in 
a four-year period, by year 
 
Notes: Author’s calculations from British Household Panel Survey data (Levy and Jenkins, 2012). 
Year labels refer to the first year of each four-year period, e.g. ‘1991’ refers to the years 1991–1994. 
The poverty line for each year is 60% of median net household income (BHC). Poverty counts refer to 
poverty status around the date of the annual BHPS interview. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Although social policy has often treated poverty as the main feature of the income 
distribution of interest, recent distributional trends in the UK suggest that other 
features demand as much attention and analysis. This paper has drawn attention to the 
stagnation in real income growth for those at the bottom while at the same time 
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incomes at the top have been growing, particularly at the very top. The distributional 
issues for the UK of contemporary concern are as much the growth in the prevalence 
of advantage rather than disadvantage – growing inequality as much as poverty. 
 
The reasons why the growth in inequality is an important social issue nowadays are 
threefold: there are views that the higher incomes were not fairly achieved, that 
greater income inequality is associated with greater inequalities in many other spheres, 
and that greater inequality may have deleterious consequences for economic growth. 
 
The relationship between inequality and economic growth has long been controversial 
but recent research concludes that, among OECD countries, ‘when income inequality 
rises, economic growth falls. One reason is that poorer members of society are less 
able to invest in their education. Tackling inequality can make our societies fairer and 
our economies stronger’ (OECD, 2014: 1). Others have emphasised that stagnation in 
incomes at the bottom has been accompanied by unsustainable growth in household 
debt that may have led to the recent financial crisis or at least hindered recovery from 
it. For a review of evidence, see Lucchino and Morelli (2012).  
 
There is a growing literature arguing that income inequality growth is harmful because 
it weakens the fabric of our society and social cohesion in its broadest sense. The 
fabric is represented by a shared experience of a common education system, health 
service, and pensions, as well as fundamental democratic principles such as one-
person one-vote and equality before the law. The problem is that the very rich may 
increasingly opt out of, or be less willing to contribute to, the collective pot that 
finances benefits and services, or deploy their resources to secure outcomes that are 
favourable to their own interests via politics, media, or the law. To date, the literature 
on this topic has mostly been about the USA, no doubt reflecting the fact that 
inequality levels and inequality growth have been greater there than in the UK. (See, 
for example, Bartels (2008), Hacker and Pierson (2010), and Stiglitz (2012).) Given 
the distributional trends in the UK that have been described in this paper, analysis of 
their consequences is an important topic for analysis on this side of the Atlantic as 
well. Extensive discussion of what can be done about economic inequality is provided 
by Atkinson (2015). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Real income growth rates (%), by subperiod 
 1961–2012 1961–71 1971–81 1981–91 1991–2001 2001–11 2007–12 
p10 89.2 14.4 18.0 6.2 28.5 3.8 0.9 
 (1.3) (1.4) (1.7) (0.6) (2.5) (0.4) (0.2) 
p50 97.4 14.8 12.4 27.9 20.5 –0.6 –4.5 
 (1.3) (1.4) (1.2) (2.5) (1.9) (–0.1) (–0.9) 
p90 129.6 16.9 16.6 45.6 19.2 –2.3 –6.2 
 (1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (3.8) (1.8) (–0.2) (–1.3) 
Mean 117.3 15.8 13.1 37.5 22.9 –0.2 –6.2 
 (1.5) (1.5) (1.2) (3.2) (2.1) (–0.0) (–1.3) 
Notes: Author’s calculations using data from IFS (2014). p10, p50, and p90 are the 10th percentile, 
50th percentile (median), and 90th percentile, respectively. The numbers in parentheses for each 
period are annualised growth rates per annum. The data refer to financial years from 1994 onwards, 
and the estimates refer to the UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. 
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Table A2:Where in the income distribution individuals spent the majority of 
their time over nine-year periods, 1991–1999 and 2000–2008 
 Quintile group in 1991 
 Bottom 
(poorest) 
Second Third Fourth Top 
(richest) 
All 
individuals 
All years in the same quintile 
group as 1991 14   3   2   3   24   9 
Majority of years in same 
quintile group as 1991 43 36 34 39 39 38 
Majority of years above 1991 
quintile group 43 31 24 15 ... 23 
Majority of years below 1991 
quintile group ... 15 25 30 37 21 
None of the above ... 14 15 13 ...   8 
All individuals 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Quintile group in 2000 
All years in the same quintile 
group as 2000 14   3   2   4 26 10 
Majority of years in same 
quintile group as 2000 41 36 32 36 34 36 
Majority of years above 2000 
quintile group 45 31 25 16 … 23 
Majority of years below 2000 
quintile group … 14 25 29 40 22 
None of the above … 17 15 16 …   9 
All individuals 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: Source is Department for Work and Pensions (2010, Tables 3.2 (BHC) and 3.3 (BHC)), 
derived from British Household Panel Survey data. ‘Majority of years in same quintile group’ row: 
five or more years out of nine in the same quintile group as in base-year but does not include the 
individuals in the ‘All years in same quintile’ row. ‘None of the above’ implies that the individual has 
neither remained in the same quintile group as the base-year, nor been in a higher or lower quintile 
group for five of the nine years. ‘…’: no estimate (not logically possible given definitions of groups). 
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Figure A1: The Gini coefficient since 1961: BHC and AHC series compared 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data from IFS (2014). 
 
Figure A2: Trends in the Gini coefficient: the UK compared to the EU-15 
average 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using EU-SILC-based estimates reported in Eurostat (2014, series 
ilc_di12). The EU-15 estimates are population-weighted averages of estimates for national member 
states. 
After housing costs
Before housing costs
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
G
in
i c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
 
United Kingdom
EU-15
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
G
in
i c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
 
(%
)
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
 
28 
Figure A3: Share of total income held by the top 1%: UK, France, Germany, and 
the USA 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data from the World Top Incomes Database (Alvaredo et al., 
2014). The vertical dashed line marks the change in the definition of the tax unit from the family to 
the individual in the UK in 1990.  
 
Figure A4: Proportions of persons with income below 60% of contemporary 
median income (BHC): all individuals, children, and pensioners, 1961–2012 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data from IFS (2014). The data refer to financial years from 
1994 onwards, and the estimates to the UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. 
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Figure A5: Proportions of persons with income below 60% median: BHC vs 
AHC series compared 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by the author using data from IFS (2014). The data refer to financial years from 
1994 onwards, and the estimates to the UK from 2002–03 and Great Britain in earlier years. 
 
Figure A6: Poverty rates (%) using relative and anchored thresholds: UK and 
EU-15 average 
 
Notes: Graph drawn by author using EU-SILC-based estimates reported in Eurostat (2014, series 
ilc_li02 and ilc_li22b). The solid lines show poverty rates calculated using a relative threshold (60% 
of contemporary national median income); the dashed lines show poverty rates calculated using an 
anchored threshold (60% of national median income in 2008). Estimates of anchored poverty rates are 
available only from 2008 onwards.  
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Figure A7: Percentages of taxpayers with an after-tax income greater than 
£100,000 per year (2012–13 prices), by subgroup 
 
Notes: Years shown are financial years, e.g. 2010 refers to 2010–11. The data refer to taxpayers only, 
and are not available for 2008–09. Data for 1995–96 are not used because of a series discontinuity 
(introduction of self-assessment and changes to the SPI methodology). Graph drawn by the author 
using data from the public-use files of the Survey of Personal Incomes (various years). Incomes 
converted to 2012–13 prices using within-year averages of the monthly Consumer Price Index for 
each financial year. Reading note: 7% of taxpayers working in the financial industry had an after-tax 
income of more than £100,000 in financial year 2009–10. 
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